ABSTRACT Vehicular networking involves the storage, compute, and analysis of massive vehicular data. Vehicular cloud computing, as a special cloud computing platform, seamlessly combines vehicular ad hoc networks and conventional cloud computing. However, in the vehicular cloud computing, there is still the problem of unauthorized users accessing and stealing data. In the traditional ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme, a trusted central authority is employed to manage attributes and distribute keys. Based on multi-authority (MA) CP-ABE, we propose a secure and revocable access control scheme for vehicular cloud computing in this paper, in which the requester can decrypt the ciphertext with only a small amount of computation. We show that our MA-CP-ABE scheme can prevent static corruption of authorities in the standard model under the decisional q-parallel bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption. Theoretical analysis and experimental simulation results show that our scheme has lower communication cost and lower computational complexity than other schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC) was first proposed by Abuelela and Olariu [1] , which is important for improving traffic management and information sharing through the combination of cloud computing and vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). VCC [2] , [3] is a mobile cloud computing model, in which drivers can cooperate with each other to achieve information sharing and they also can share or rent various underutilized vehicular resources such as storage, network connectivity and computing power on the Internet [1] , [4] , [5] . Meanwhile, the vehicle running data, the vehicle driver's physical condition and traffic conditions information can be used by auto manufacturers, health care workers and traffic command centers to improve services.
The VCC is an open environment where the vehicular device interacts with other facilities such as other vehicles, roadside units, and conventional cloud. Therefore, VCC faces many security threats. Yan et al. [6] pointed out that information disclosure is one of security threats in VCC. And Mekki et al. [7] also emphasize privacy and trust issues in VCC.
Similar to the traditional cloud platform, the data security issues in the vehicular cloud platform mainly include the confidentiality and access rights of sensitive data. In general, auto manufacturers only need to obtain the operating data of the car itself, health care workers can only access the car driver's physical status data, and traffic command center may have a higher authority. Entities with different attributes can only access different data. Therefore, an efficient and secure access control scheme is expected to be applied to VCC.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We propose a secure and revocable access control scheme for VCC in this paper, which can achieve attribute revocation and efficient decryption. Our research has the following contributions:
1) An efficient access control scheme based CP-ABE with multi-authority is proposed. 2) The user only needs a small amount of computation to decrypt the ciphertext. 3) Attribute revocation can be achieved in our scheme by updating the secret key and ciphertext corresponding the revoked attribute, which just needs low computation. 4) By comparing with other schemes in the computation complexity and communication overhead, it shows that our scheme is efficient.
clouds by adding key distribution centers (KDCs), which is based on the MA-ABE scheme [19] . Yang et al. [23] and Yang and Jia [24] presented two efficient MA access control schemes for data storage system in, both of which are attribute revocable and provably secure in the random oracle model. However, the ciphertext size in these two schemes is large. Recently, some scholars have put forward some new ABE schemes to ensure attribute privacy. Zhang et al. [25] presented two anonymous ABE constructions, which can enhance attribute privacy and improve the efficiency of decrypting in mobile cloud computing. Further, Zhang et al. [26] presented a privacy-aware access control scheme in smart health, which not only hides the access policy well but also supports lager attribute universe. Huang and Verma [27] proposed an attribute-based security policy enforcement (ASPE) framework, which is based on CP-ABE. However, this work does not consider the collusion attack. Besides, it is assumed that the roadside units (RSUs) have not been compromised in their scheme. Later, Ruj et al. [28] presented a novel access control structure to resolve the shortcoming. However, the scheme performs a large number of pairing, which increases the computation complexity. Yeh et al. [29] presented an attribute-based access control system (ABACS) for emergency services in VANETs. Liu et al. [30] presented a flexible access control scheme with authentication by using a hierarchical multiple authorities CP-ABE and combining attribute-based signature(ABS). However, the scheme has a large computation complexity and communication cost. Xia et al. [31] proposed a CP-ABE delegation scheme to improve the decryption efficiency of vehicles, in which a single authority TC (trusted center) is employed to manage system attributes and distribute secret keys for the vehicles. This will increase the pressure of TC for managing attributes and keys and reduce the security of VANETs. Huang et al. [32] presented a secure message access control scheme to achieve authentication of message sources. However, this scheme has a large computation complexity in the key generation phase. In addition, none of these solutions provide an attribute revocation mechanism.
C. ORGANIZATION
The preliminaries, the system model, the syntax of our MA-CP-ABE scheme and the security model are detailed in Section II. Our scheme is described in detail in Section III. We make security analysis and complexity comparison for our proposed scheme in Section IV. Section V summarizes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES, MODEL AND SYNTAX

A. PRELIMINARIES 1) ACCESS STRUCTURE
The definition is as described in [15] and [33] . Our scheme uses a monotonous access structure, which is a monotone collection A of nonempty subsets of {P 1 , · · ·, P n }, VOLUME 6, 2018 i.e., A ⊆ 2 {P 1 ,···,P n } \ {∅}. We call the sets included in A the authorized sets. Otherwise, they are called the unauthorized sets. Generally, the requesters are described by attributes.
2) CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
CP-ABE [15] is a fine-grained access control scheme, in which users' private keys correspond to different sets of attributes and access policies are embedded in ciphertext. When the access policy needs to change, the data owner just updates the ciphertext. The CP-ABE scheme generally includes Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt.
3) BILINEAR MAPS
p is a prime number, and G 1 and G 2 are two multiplicative groups with order p. g is a generator of G 1 . e: G 1 × G 1 −→ G 2 is a map with between the groups G 1 and G 2 . If e has the following properties, then e is a bilinear map.
• Bilinearity: e(g a 1 , g b 2 ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) ab for two random g 1 , g 2 ∈ G 1 and two random a, b ∈ Z * p .
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1 where 1 denotes the identity element of G 1 .
• Computability: For all g 1 , g 2 ∈ G 1 there is an algorithm that can efficiently calculate e(g 1 , g 2 ).
4) DECISIONAL q-PARALLEL BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN EXPONENT (q-PARALLEL BDHE) ASSUMPTION [16]
The definition of decisional q-parallel BDHE problem is as described in [16] . Given a bilinear map (p,
If the adversary is given
it must be difficult to distinguish between e(g, g) a q+1 s ∈ G 2 and a random element R ∈ G 2 .
An algorithm B guesses z ∈ {0, 1} with advantage in solving the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem in G 2 if
Definition 1: As in [16] , we say that the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds if there is not any polynomial time algorithm to solve the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem with a non-negligible advantage.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
In our system, there are five entities as shown in Figure 1 : the vehicular cloud (VC), the trusted third party (TTP), the attribute authorities(AAs), the data owner and the requester. The VC consists of VANETs and conventional cloud computing platform, providing users with storage and computing services (mainly information sharing and data analysis). The TTP initializes the system parameters and registers each attribute authority and users. The AAs distribute attributes and secret keys for users. The data owner (vehicle driver) encrypts data and stores them in the VC. The requester wants to share the data in the vehicular cloud. It can be a vehicular user, a traffic management center, an auto manufacturer, a health care center. 
C. SYNTAX
Our MA-CP-ABE includes five algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Decrypt and Revoke.
Setup(1 κ ): This algorithm inputs a security parameter 1 κ and outputs the public parameters PP and the master secret key MSK. Meanwhile, attribute authorities and users are registered with the participation of the TTP.
Encrypt(PP, (M, ρ), k): This algorithm inputs PP, an LSSS access structure (M, ρ) and the symmetric key k, and outputs the ciphertext CT, which is sent to the VC.
KeyGen(PP, A uid j ): This algorithm inputs PP and the user's attribute set A uid j , and outputs a secret key SK uid j .
Decrypt(•): In our scheme, the decryption process is divided into two steps:
• Pre-Decryption(CT, SK uid j ): This algorithm inputs CT and SK uid j , and outputs a decryption token TK .
• Decryption(TK, GSK uid j ): This algorithm inputs TK and the user's global secret key GSK uid j , and outputs k. Revoke( x i , uid j ): This algorithm inputs an attribute x i of the user uid j to be revoked, and outputs the new ciphertext and the new secret keys of non-revoked users related to the attribute x i .
D. SECURITY MODEL
The security model of our MA-CP-ABE is described by an interactive game between a challenger and an adversary. Before defining it, we make sure the following condition to be satisfied: given a challenge ciphertext CT * , the adversary can not query any secret keys used to decrypt CT * . Similar to [19] , assume that the adversary can only statically corrupt the authorities, but key queries are made adaptively. Let S A denote the set of attribute authorities and N denote the number of universal attributes.
Setup:
The public parameters PP and the master secret key MSK are generated by running Setup(1 κ ). The adversary specifies a set S A ⊂ S A of corrupted authorities. For uncorrupted authorities S A \ S A , the challenger obtains public/private key pairs by registering authorities and sends the public keys and PP to the adversary.
Phase 1: The adversary is permitted to make secret key queries. The adversary submits pairs (uid j , S U uid j ) to the challenger, where S U uid j denotes a set of attributes belonging to several uncorrupted AAs. The challenger returns the corresponding secret keys to the adversary.
Challenge: The adversary specifies an identity u C , two messages (m 0 , m 1 ) of equal length, and a challenge access matrix (M * , ρ * ), which must meet some constraints. First, none of the attribute sets from Phase 1 satisfy the challenge access matrix. Second, no subset of attributes controlled by corrupted AAs satisfies the challenge access matrix. In other words, the adversary cannot ask for a set of keys to allow decryption, in conjunction with any keys that can be obtained from corrupted AAs. The challenger flips a fair coin with {0, 1} and obtains δ ∈ {0, 1}. It computes the ciphertext CT * for the message m δ with the identity u C and access matrix (M * , ρ * ) and sends CT * to the adversary.
Phase 2: The adversary may adaptively repeat Phase 1. without violating the constraints on the matrix (M * , ρ * ). Guess. The adversary guesses a value δ on δ.
The adversary wins if δ = δ. The adversary's advantage in the game is defined to be Adv = Pr[δ = δ] − 1 2 . Definition 2: Similar to [19] , an MA-CP-ABE scheme can resist the static corruption of authorities, if no any polynomial time adversaries have a non-negligible advantage in the above game.
III. OUR CONSTRUCTION
We present the construction of MA-CP-ABE by combining the ideas of Waters [16] and Yang [23] in this section. Assume that the communication in our construction is performed through a secure channel such as SSH.
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
The TTP runs Setup(1 κ ) to obtain a bilinear map. It first randomly selects a value a ∈ Z p as the master key MSK and calculates the public key PK = g a , where g is a generator of G 1 . Then, N random group elements h 1 , . . . , h N ∈ G 1 are selected to be related to universal attributes. The public parameters is published as PP = (g, g a , h 1 , . . . , h N ).
• AA Registration Each AA is registered with the help of the TTP, which assigns a unique identity a k for the AA. Let A k be the set of attributes managed by the authority AA a k . The AA a k chooses two random numbers α k , β k ∈ Z p as its secret key SK a k = (α k , β k ) and calculates PK a k = e(g, g) α k as its public key. For each attribute x i ∈ A k , the authority chooses an attribute version value as VK x i = v x i and computes the attribute key as
• User Registration Each user also is registered with the help of the TTP, which also assigns a unique identity uid j for the user. Then, the user uid j randomly chooses two number u j , z j ∈ Z p and computes g 1/z j , g au j . Finally, the user uid j sets the public key GPK uid j = g u j and the secret key GSK uid j = z j .
B. DATA ENCRYPTION
The owner first uses symmetric encryption methods to encrypt data. Then, the Encrypt algorithm is run to encrypt the symmetric key. The Encrypt algorithm inputs the public parameter, the symmetric key k and an LSSS access structure (M, ρ). Let M be an l × n matrix with ρ mapping its rows to attributes which are selected by the data owner, where l is the number of attributes. Let S c be the set of attributes involved in the ciphertext. It first chooses randomly a vector − → v = (s, y 2 , . . . , y n ) ∈ Z n p , where y 2 , . . . , y n are applied to share the encryption exponent s.
C. KEY GENERATION
Assume that the user uid j owns a set S j of attributes, and S j = k∈I uid j S j,k , where S j,k is the set of attributes managed by the attribute authority AA a k in the set S j and I uid j is the index set of attribute authorities associated with the user uid j . The user uid j sends (uid j , g au j , g 1/z j ) to AAs. Then, the KeyGen algorithm is run. The TTP first chooses a number t j ∈ Z p randomly and calculates the partial private keys L j = g t j and R j = g at j for the user uid j . Meanwhile, the TTP sends the secret value t j to send to AA a k . Then, each AA a k , k ∈ I uid j computes
And the user (uid j ) s full key is
Each legitimate user can ask for encrypted data stored in the VC. However, only users whose attributes satisfy the access structure can decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the data. The decryption includes the following steps:
• Pre-decryption by the Server. The user uid j asks the server for a decryption token by sending its keys 
• Data Decryption by the User. The user uid j can use the decryption token TK and its secret key GSK uid j = z j to decrypt k = C TK z j . Then, it can use k to decrypt and obtain data.
E. ATTRIBUTE REVOCATION
The attribute revocation mechanism is similar to [23] . Assume that the attribute x i of the user uid r needs to be revoked, which is managed by the AA a k . The revocation mechanism consists of three steps: Firstly, AA a k generates the update keys of the attribute that needs to be revoked. Secondly, the cloud server updates the corresponding ciphertext. Finally, AA a k updates the secret keys of the user whose attribute x i is not revoked. Note that we only update the ciphertext component and the key component corresponding to the revoked attribute. 1) Let v x i denote the current attribute version value and GPK uid j (j ∈ U non ) denote the users' public keys, where U non be the set of users whose corresponding attributes are not revoked. The corresponding authority AA a k first chooses a new attribute version value VK x i = v x i and computes the attribute update parameter as
, which is used to compute three update keys
Then, the new public attribute key PK x i , the ciphertextupdate key CUK x i , and the user's key-update key KUK j, x i are respectively sent to data owners, the server, and each non-revoked user uid j (j ∈ U non ).
2) The server updates the ciphertexts related to the revoked attribute x i . It only needs to update a few components of the ciphertext related to the revoked attribute. The new ciphertext is calculated
3) The user uid j updates its secret key as
Note that the KUK j, x i of each non-revoked user is related to different t j , so that the revoked user uid r cannot update its key by using the key-update keys of non-revoked users. Similar to [23] , our MA-CP-ABE scheme also ensures forward security and backward security.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1:
If there is an adversary A who can break our MA-CP-ABE scheme with non-negligible advantage , an algorithm B can be built to solve the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem with non-negligible advantage. Suppose it selects an l * × n * challenge access matrix, where l * , n * ≤ q. Proof: We refer to the proof procedure in [16] and [23] . Initialization: The simulator B is challenged with an instance of the q-parallel BDHE problem − → y , T . Furthermore, the adversary A chooses the challenge access matrix (M * , ρ * ).
Setup: B generates a bilinear map (p, G 1 , G 2 , e, g) and sends the public parameters to A. A selects a set of corrupted authorities S A ⊂ S A , which is displayed to the simulator. For each uncorrupted authority AA a k (k ∈ S A −S A ), the simulator selects a random numbers α k , β k ∈ Z p (k ∈ S A −S A ) and sets
Similar to [16] , B ''programs'' the group elements
. Moreover, due to the value of g d x i , the parameters are randomly distributed. The public key of each uncorrupted authority AA a k is computed
B randomly chooses a version number v x i ∈ Z p and simulates the public attribute key PK x i
B sends a user identity uid j to A and chooses randomly u j , z j ∈ Z p . Then, it sets GSK uid j = z j and implicitly sets u j = u j − a q z j by setting
Then, B sends the public/private key pairs (GPK uid j , GSK uid j ) to A.
Phase 1: B responds secret key queries from A in this phase. A submits pairs (uid j , A k ) to B, where A k denotes a set of attributes managed by an uncorrupted authority AA a k . Assume that A k does not meet M * with any keys that can be obtained from corrupted authorities.
B first randomly chooses a value r ∈ Z p . Then it finds a vector − → w = (w 1 , . . . , w n * ) ∈ Z n * p that satisfies
and computes N j,k = g β k z j . By the definition of u j , g au j contains g a q+1 , which can be eliminated by the unknown term in g α k /z j when creating K j,k . B computes
If x i ∈ A k is not included in the access matrix. In other words, no i satisfies ρ * (i) = x i . For those attributes, we set
Challenge: B programs the challenge ciphertext in the phase. When A wants to end phase 1, it sends two messages (m 0 , m 1 ) of equal length to B. B throws a coin with {0, 1} to get δ ∈ {0, 1}. It computes
and C = g s .
Since C i contains terms to be eliminated, to simulate it is hard. But B can choose the secret splitting to eliminate these. Intuitively, B randomly selects y 2 , . . . , y n * and shares s using the vector
For i = 1, . . . , n * , let R i denote the set of all k = i but ρ * (i) = ρ * (k). The share of the secret can be constructed from the vector − → v .
B also randomly selects r . It computes the challenge ciphertext components C = g −r g −sb i . Then, the C i can be simulated
Phase 2: A can adaptively make the additional secret key queries without violating the constraint on (M * , ρ * ). B responds as in Phase 1.
Guess: A guesses a value δ on δ. Theorem 2: Our MA-CP-ABE can resist the collusion attack.
Proof: Similar to [23] , in our MA-CP-ABE, each user is assigned a unique identity uid j . And they obtain secret keys associated with their identities from different AA a i . In addition, each AA is assigned a unique identity a i . Thus, multiple users cannot conspire to decrypt the ciphertext.
Privacy-Preserving Guarantee Similar to [23] , decryption is outsourced to the server in our scheme. Even if the server obtains the user's attribute keys, it still cannot obtain the data information. Since it does not know the user's global secret keys, it cannot decrypt the ciphertext. Besides, in our scheme the original ciphertext is re-encrypted to implement ciphertext update, so the server cannot decrypt the ciphertext.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We now make a comparison of our scheme with some existing schemes. First, we compare the features of these schemes as shown in Table 1 , where NA denotes Not Applicable. Waters [16] does not take into account attribute revocation, and others involve attribute revocation. Similar to [23] , in our scheme, each AA independently performs the attribute revocation and the server updates the ciphertexts, which greatly reduces the owner's workload. Meanwhile, the revocation mechanism can ensure both forward security and backward security. Moreover, our scheme is provably secure under the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption in the standard model.
Secondly, we compare our scheme with some existing schemes in computation complexity and communication cost. Table 2 presents the notes used in this section. Table 3 shows the computation complexity of different schemes. We assume that all operations are dyadic operation and that the prime number p of all schemes is same. T H , T E , and T P respectively denote one hash operation, one exponentiation in a group and one bilinear pairing operation. Here, we suppose the size of the LSSS access matrix of different schemes is same. Obviously, [23] and our scheme achieves lower computation complexity of user decryption than others. Moreover, our scheme has lower computation complexity than [23] in the phases of data encryption and secret key generation. Although [16] and [31] have lower computation complexity in the secret key generation phase, they are to manage all attributes and distribute keys by a single authority. Besides, Liu et al. [30] , Xia et al. [31] , and Huang et al. [32] do not support attribute revocation. Table 4 presents the size of the ciphertext and secret key of different schemes. From Table 4 , it can be seen that [16] and [31] are comparable to others, since they are not the multi-authority CP-ABE scheme. Obviously, our scheme has lower communication cost compared with [22] , [23] , [30] , and [32] .
Then, we conducted experiments on our scheme using Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library, which supports pairing operation. Here, we use the Microsoft Visual C++ conversion pbc-0.4.7-vc and the crypto library of OpenSSL version openssl-0.9.8zd. All algorithms were coded using C programming language and conducted on a system with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3470 CPU at 3.20GHz and 3.20GHz and 4.00GB RAM in Windows 7. Type A pairings are used in the simulation, which are constructed on the curve y 2 = x 3 +x over the field F q for some prime q = 3 mod 4. This pairing is symmetric, where the order of groups is 160 bits, the base field size is 512 bits and the embedding degree is 2.
In the experiments, we suppose that the global attribute set A = {A, B, C, D, E, F, G}, the set of attribute authorities S A = {AA 1 , AA 2 }, A 1 = {A, B, C}, A 2 = {D, E, F, G} and the attribute set of the user uid j is S j = {A, D}. We set an access tree A AND (D OR (B AND C)) [19] . The equivalent LSSS matrix is:
The experiment results are shown in Figure 2 . We can see that our scheme has a significant advantage in the phases of Encrypt and KegGen. Although the scheme of Yang et al. [23] and our scheme have a longer execution time in Setup, both schemes support outsourcing decryption and the user only need one exponentiation to decrypt the content key. In addition, since our scheme does not contain hash function, it has lower computation complexity than [23] . In summary, our scheme is more efficient than other schemes.
In addition, we compare the time required for the encryption phase of [23] and our scheme with the number of attributes contained in the access structure with |AA M | = 2. The results are shown in Figure 3 . We can see that the encryption time of our scheme is much lower than that of [23] . We also compare the time required for the secret key generation phase with the number of attributes owned by the user with |I uid | = 2, as shown in Figure 4 . Obviously, our scheme is superior to [23] .
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a secure and revocable access control scheme based multi-authority CP-ABE for vehicular cloud computing, which is efficient and provably secure in the standard model under the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption. In our scheme, the ciphertext size is greatly reduced. In addition, the requester only needs one exponentiation in a group to decrypt the ciphertext, which is suitable for users with resource-constrained devices. 
